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Hungarian Pension System and its Reform 
ANDRÁS SIMONOVITS   
Abstract 
 
The  goal  of  this  study  is  to  present  an  insider  view  on  the  pension  reforms 
implemented in Hungary between 1996 and 2009. Both political economy as well as 
institutional economics will be used as the main approaches to analyse and explain the 
reform process and some of its effects. The following studies provide valuable insights: 
Palacios and Rocha (1998), Bokros and Dethier eds. (1998), Augusztinovics (1999), 
Augusztinovics et al. (2002), Simonovits (1999), (2000), (2008a), Czúcz and Pintér 
(2002), European Commission (2006), Gál (2006), Impavido and Rocha (2006), and 
Guardiancich (2008). The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 1 considers the 
legacy of the pension system. Section 2 summarises the debate on the pension reform 
and the basic decisions. Section 3 outlines the implementation of the pension reform, 
while  Section  4  discusses  the  implementation  problems.  Section  5  describes  the 
changes since the reform, while Section 6 analyses and Section 7 evaluates the reform. 
An Appendix discusses the issues of contribution rates. 
 
Keywords:  Hungary, pension reform, social security, private pension 
 
JEL: H55, J14, J26, J32  
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E tanulmány célja: az 1996 és 2009 közötti magyar nyugdíjreformok benfentes leírása. Mind a 
politikai  gazdaságtani,  mind  az  intézményes  gazdaságtani  megközelítést  alkalmazzuk  a 
reformfolyamat  és  hatásainak  elemzéséhez  és  magyarázatához.  A  következő  tanulmányok 
értékes  magyarázatokat  adnak:  Palacios  és  Rocha  (1998),  Bokros  és  Dethier  eds.  (1998), 
Augusztinovics  (1999),  Augusztinovics  et  al.  (2002),  Simonovits  (1999),  (2000),  (2008a), 
Czúcz  és  Pintér  (2002),  European  Commission  (2006),  Gál  (2006),  Impavido  and  Rocha 
(2006), valamint Guardiancich (2008). A tanulmány szerkezete a következő: az 1. szakasz a 
nyugdíjrendszer  örökségét  elemzi.  A  2.  szakasz  összegzi  a  nyugdíjreformmal  kapcsolatos 
vitákat és az alapvető döntéseket.  A 3. szakasz a nyugdíjreform végrehajtűsűt körvonalazza, 
ímg  a  4.  szakasz  a  végrehajtással  kapcs9latos  problémákat.    Az  5.  szakasz  a  reform  óta 
bekövetkezett változásokat írja le, míg a 6. szakasz elemzi, és a 7. szakasz értékeli a reformot.  




Tárgyszavak: Magyarország, nyugdíjreform, tb nyugdíj, magánnyugdíj 
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1. LEGACY OF THE PENSION SYSTEM 
In Hungary the first mandatory (funded) pension system was started in 1928 and covered 
about half the adult population (namely every worker except for farmers and self employed). 
During the years of the Second World War and the ensuing hyperinflation, a large part of the 
assets of the pension funds was destroyed. In the emerging socialist (communist) system, the  
reason to replace the bankrupt funded system by a pay-as-you-go system was even stronger 
than  in  countries  that  remained  market  economies:  in  the  latter  system,  every  year  the 
pensions are paid from the current contributions of the workers. Due to the abrupt elimination 
of small traders and artisans in the 1950s and the forced collectivisation of the agriculture by 
1961,  the  whole  economy  became  "socialised".  As  a  logical  consequence  of  this  historical 
process, by 1975 practically every worker (employed in the state or the cooperative sector) 
became  a  full right  contributor  to  the  unified  pension  system.  In  harmony  with  full 
employment, normal retirement ages were rather low: 60 for males and 55 for females. Due to 
many factors, life expectancy has been stagnating since 1960 (about 65 years for males and 74 
for females) and lagged more and more behind those of the developed countries. This process 
somewhat alleviated the pension burden, because premature death was concentrated on older 
workers and pensioners rather than on infants. 
In the years of maturation of the system, the replacement rate (i.e. the ratio of the average 
pension to average wage) increased spectacularly, especially when the real wages ceased to 
increase: from 37% in 1970 to 66% in 1990 (Table 1). Hungary being the most market oriented 
socialist economy since 1968, its government tolerated slow inflation and relied more on wage 
incentives  than  most  socialist  countries  did.  As  a  result,  the  link  between  earnings  and 
pensions was stronger than in the other socialist countries, especially for the entry pensions, 
given just after retirement.   
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Table 1.  
Pensions in the Hungarian economy, 1970–1996, in % 














of net  
earnings 
1970  3.5  66.7  38.7  37.5  91.2  305.1 
1975  5.0  82.1  37.3  45.4  87.8  315.1 
1980  6.9  93.0  38.2  54.7  87.3  320.1 
1985  7.9  100.0  40.4  61.2  86.9  358.7 
1990  8.8  109.9  41.8  66.2  86.4  398.4 
1996  8.9  119.2  40.7  58.9  64.0  504.5 
Source: Simonovits (2003, Table 8.2, p. 79) from Réti.  
 
There was, however, a principal error in the indexation rule of continued pensions. Sticking 
to  the  optimistic  assumption  of  annual  inflation  rate  of  2%  made  in  1968,  the  minimum 
increases  of  pensions  were  also  set  that  low.  On  the  other  hand,  after  1975,  inflation 
accelerated in Hungary as well, and nominal values of low pensions needed to be increased 
much faster than by 2% just to assure the social minimum. To restrain the growth of total 
pensions, higher entry pensions were slashed in real terms. This dynamic redistribution was 
achieved through imposing tight lower and upper bounds for pension raises, thus the structure 
of "old" pensions lost its connection with that of entry pensions. 
Nevertheless,  the  situation  of  pensioners  was  acceptable  during  the  mature  socialism, 
especially  if  one  takes  into  account  that  the  prices  of  basic  goods  and  services,  including 
medical services were heavily subsidised. 
The start of the transition from socialism to capitalism has totally changed the scenery. The 
whole economy was reorganised, privatised and adjusted to the demand of the world market 
rather than to that of the Soviet type socialist system. The building down of older factories and 
(collective)  farms  preceded  the  creation  of  new  ones,  leading  to  a  sharp  drop  in  output, 
consumption and to the emergence of mass unemployment (Table 2). Logically, older workers 
preferred  early  or  disability  retirement  to  becoming  unemployed  and  the  governments 
tolerated or even encouraged this practice (cf. Lelkes and Scharle, 2004). As a result, about 
30% of the previous labour force left formal employment, became in part unemployed, in part 
early  pensioner  and  in  part  inactive  (either  really  not  working  or  working  in  the  hidden 
economy). According to Table 1, the participation rate dropped from 86% in 1990 to 64% in 
1996.  
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Table 2.  
Macro data for Hungary: 1989− − − −2004 
Year  Produced GDPa  Consumptiona    Employmentb 
(%) ratio 
Unemploymentc 
ratio LFS (%) 
1989  100  100  −  0 
1990  96.2  97.3  75.9  − 
1991  84.9  92.3  71.0  − 
1992  82.3  92.7  64.5  9.8 
1993  81.7  97.7  60.8  11.9 
1994  84.2  95.4  59.8  10.7 
1995  85.4  89.2  58.7  10.2 
1996  86.8  86.1  58.3  9.9 
1997  90.9  88.0  58.4  8.7 
1998  95.3  91.5  59.5  7.8 
1999  99.4  96.4  61.3  7.0 
2000  103.6  99.1  61.4  6.4 
2001  107.7  105.0  60.4  5.7 
2002  111.3  113.2  60.7  5.8 
2003  118.2  117.5  60.8  5.9 
2004  121.5  120.7  61.3  6.1 
2005  126.4  125.4     7.2 
2006  131.4  125.8    7.5 
2007  132.8       7.7 
Source:  a)  CSO  (2007),  Table  1.9,  b)  and  c)  Fazekas  and  Koltay,  eds.  (2006):  Statistical 
Appendix. Because the size of population has been decreasing by 0.3-0.4% per year, the per 
capita values are correspondingly higher. No correction is made for the raised retirement ages. 
 
To ease the transition from a rigid planned economy to a flexible market economy, price 
liberalisation  was  inevitable.  Together  with  huge  budget  deficits,  this  implied  two digit 
inflation rates for a long time, peaking at 35% in 1991 but staying above 10% until 2001 (Table 
3).   
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Table 3.  
Price and real income series for Hungary: 1989− − − −2007 (%) 




Real net incomea  Real pensionsb 
1989  100  100  100  100 
1990  129  94.3  98.0  94.6 
1991  174  87.7  96.4  88.1 
1992  214  86.5  92.8  85.9 
1993  262  83.1  88.4  82.8 
1994  311  89.0  91.2  86.9 
1995  399  78.2  86.8  78.3 
1996  493  74.3  86.8  71.3 
1997  583  77.9  87.6  72.0 
1998  667  80.7  90.8  76.6 
1999  734  82.7  91.6  79.5 
2000  806  83.9  95.3  80.6 
2001  881  89.3  98.5  85.3 
2002  928  101.4  104.4  93.7 
2003   970  112.6  108.4  101.8 
2004  1036  111.4  112.0  105.2 
2005  1073  118.4  116.1  111.8 
2006  1114  122.5  118.0  116.7 
2007  1204  116.7    120.0 
Sources a) CSO (2007), Table 1.2, b) Hungarian PI Statistics 
 
In 1992, an independent Pension Insurance Fund (PIF) was established and hived off from 
the government budget, with its own administration, budget and elected Self governing Body 
responsible to Parliament. A similar Health Insurance Fund (HIF) was created at the same 
time,  to  finance  health care  institutions  and  distribute  sick  pay,  among  other  duties. 
Responsibility for the disabled persons and their survivors was divided between the two funds. 
The  HIF  took  responsibility  for  paying  disability  benefits  for  persons  below  the  statutory 
retirement age, and in the case of their death, for their survivors. The same benefits were paid 
by the PIF for disabled people above the statutory age and their survivors. (As a disability 
pensioner reached statutory retirement age, the transfer of responsibility from the HIF to the 
PIF took place automatically.) Employers’ and employees’ social security contributions were 
accordingly divided between the two new funds.   
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Concerning pensions, the introduction of indexation became unavoidable. Since real wages 
also went down, it was logical to index continued pensions according to wages rather than 
prices (Table 3). Turning to the entry pensions, in Hungary it is equal to the product of the 
reference  wage  and  the  cumulated  accrual  rate.  The  reference  wage  is  a  degressive  (i.e. 
increasing but concave) function of the average of the indexed annual earnings during the 
assessment period. Until 1992 this period was the best three years of the last five. In 1992 the 
short assessment period was replaced by a longer period (starting from 1988 to the year of 
retirement).  To  limit  the  inequalities  among  entry  pensions,  strong  progression  was 
introduced  and  a  quite  low  ceiling  on  employee's  contribution  was  imposed  (reaching  its 
minimum at 1.6 times the average gross wage in 1996). As in most countries, the employer's 
contribution  had  no  ceiling.  To  strengthen  progressivity,  the  accrual  rates  were  steeply 
decreasing with employment until 1996  (3.3% until 10 years and through 2 and 1% dropped to 
0.5% after 36 years of employment), in 1996 the last rate was raised from 0.5 to 1.5%. (For 
details, see Augusztinovics, 1993 and Czúcz and Pintér, 2002).  
While the fall in real pensions was inevitable, the poor design of the pension formula made 
this process particularly painful. Antal et al. (1995a) describe the loss of value and distortions 
in the Hungarian pension system. For example, those retired around 1993 received pensions 
6% lower than the average pension, while those retired in 1990 received pensions 13% above 
the average (Table 4).  
Table 4.  
Distribution of Hungarian pensions according to the date of retirement 
Date of retirement 
 
Distribution  of  pensioners 
% 
Pension in terms of 
average pension 
    −1970    2.2    95.7 
1971−75    4.8    99.6 
1976−80  11.4    98.6 
1981−85  17.7  101.8 
1986–89  18.1  105.8 
1990    7.9  113.2 
1991    8.3    98.1 
1992    6.8    94.0 
1993    6.7    93.3 
1994    6.2    90.4 
1995    6.8    93.9 
1996    2.9    97.0 
  Source: Simonovits (2003, Table 4.4, p. 46) from Réti.   
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The real values of individual pensions fell in parallel with that of wages, and having quite 
high  pension  (and  health)  contribution  rates,  the  social  security  system  has  kept  working. 
Reaching its lowest level in 1996, real wages were 20% lower than in 1989, while real pensions 
fell 25% during the same period. (In turn, real wages fell already 10% from the peak year 1978 
till 1989, while real incomes still rose by 16%.)  
Turning  to  the  long-run  problems,  the  total  fertility  rate  kept  sinking  (reaching  1.3  by 
2000), while a hope arose that older persons would live longer. The ensuing population ageing 
may make the public financing of the pension system particularly difficult (Table 5). Moreover, 
the officially registered employment rate dropped to a very low level.  
Table 5.  
Changes in the demographic structure for Hungary: 1970− − − −2050 
  Population shares of 













1970  28.3  13.1  22.4  70.6 
1980  26.3  15.6  26.9  72.1 
1990  26.2  15.8  27.2  72.4 
2000  23.6  14.6  23.6  61.8 
         
2010  21.1  15.6  24.6  58.0 
2020  20.2  18.5  30.2  63.1 
2030  20.2  20.1  33.7  67.5 
2040  19.2  22.5  38.6  71.5 
2050  18.9  26.2  47.7  82.1 
Source: CSO (1996, Table 5, pp. 44−45) and Hablicsek (1999, p. 405).  
 
In addition to the old age demographic dependency rate (i.e. the ratio of the number of 
old age to that of working aged), we should introduce the system dependency ratio (i.e. the 
ratio of the number of pensioners to that of workers). Table 1 displays the numerical strength 
of factors determining the ratio of total pensions to output for selected years (for details, see 
Antal et al., 1995b).   
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2. DEBATE ON PENSION REFORM AND BASIC DECISIONS 
By 1996 the Hungarian economy was stabilised, the economy started to resemble more and 
more  a  developed  market  economy.  The  transformation  of  the  economy  was  basically 
completed and judged to be successful. On the other hand, the social security, i.e. the pension 
and health system by and large remained as it was before the transition. (For an early critique, 
see Kornai, 1992.) 
There was a wide spread feeling among decision makers that to solve the short  and long 
run problems of the pension system, it should also be partially privatised and prefunded. As 
the title of the World Bank (1996) formulated it: Structural reforms for sustainable growth. 
Concerning  the  short-run  problems:  Real  wages  started  to  increase,  and  due  to  wage 
indexation, real pensions did likewise. Notwithstanding the high replacement rates (average 
pension to average net wage oscillated around 60%), workers, employers and decision makers 
perceived  the  contribution  rates  as  too  high  (8+23%  in  1998).  A  widely  shared  though 
debatable opinion emerged: unless these rates are reduced significantly, the hidden economy 
will keep flourishing. Numerous economists also expressed their views that transforming a 
large part if not the whole sum of these staggering public pension contributions into private 
ones, the contribution burden can radically be reduced. According to World Bank experts (e.g. 
Palacios and Rocha, 1998), if there were no pension reform in Hungary, then the deficit of the 
pension system would rich 6% of the GDP by 2050. 
To  understand  these  plans,  we  should  refer  to  the  World  Bank  (1994)  blueprint.  This 
suggested  a  mandatory tax financed,  modest  and  flat  public  universal  pension  (Pillar  1),  a 
mandatory funded, significant and earnings related private pension (Pillar 2) and a funded 
voluntary pension (Pillar 3). The presumed basic advantages of such a system are as follows: 
Pillar 1 is so small, especially if it is means tested that the taxes needed for its financing do not 
undermine the tax paying propensity of the workers. Pillar 2 is so efficient that every worker 
will be pleased to contribute to it. Pillar 3 is voluntary and it only serves to satisfy the needs of 
very precautionary savers.  
The  World  Bank,  its  experts  and  certain  theoretical  economists  (e.g.  Feldstein,  1996) 
painted  a  very  rosy  picture  of  the  impact  of  privatisation  on  the  pension  system.  Partly 
neglecting, partly eliminating the burden of already acquired pension rights (cost of transition) 
and assuming unrealistically high real yields, such a transition appeared not only possible but 
desirable.  Not  everybody  shared  this  optimism.  It  is  remarkable  that  another  American 
proponent of pension privatisation, Kotlikoff (1997) modelled a much more complex situation, 
allowing for possible welfare losses if the means of the reform are not appropriately chosen. 
With a significant delay, well after the Hungarian reform started, Feldstein and Siebert eds.  
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(2002) discussed pension reforms in Western Europe. Other leading experts, namely Boldrin 
et  al.  (1999),  Orszag  and  Stiglitz  (2001),  Diamond  and  Orszag  (2005)  and  Bailey  and 
Kirkegaard (2009) questioned the rationality of the structural reforms ab ovo.  
Returning to the Hungarian pension system, there was a general agreement that serious 
reforms are needed. Every pension expert accepted that the public pension system should be 
made much more transparent, probably by introducing a point system like existing in Germany 
or a notional defined contribution system existing in Sweden (and introduced in Poland in 
1999). There was also an agreement that the normal as well as the actual retirement ages 
should be increased, and flexible retirement should reward or punish those who retire later or 
earlier than "normal". Here, however, the agreement ended. 
The experts of the Public Pension Authority (lead by Mária Augusztinovics) argued that a 
parametric reform of the public system is sufficient to solve the short  and long run problems 
of  the  Hungarian  pension  system.  In  a  detailed  study,  Augusztinovics  and  Martos  (1996) 
showed the macro consequences of such a reform. 
The  experts  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  influential  politicians,  however,  had  not 
accepted the sufficiency of a parametric reform. (In fact, there was an important shift in this 
direction in the working documents of the Ministries of Finance and of Welfare, 1996 and 
1997.) Following the World Bank (1994) strategy, they have opted for a three pillar pension 
system.  
Luckily, the Hungarian (and other) radical reformers were sufficiently well informed to 
choose  a  plan  rather different    from  the  World  Bank  blueprint  even  if  they  did  not  much 
emphasise  the  differences.  Pillar  1  remained  the  dominant  component,  moreover,  it  has 
become  less  rather  than  more  redistributive  than  it  was  before  the  reform.  Pillar  2  was 
designed  to  be  quite  small  (about  1/4  of  the  total  contribution  flow  there)  and  even  the 
introduction of such a small pillar has caused many budgetary complications up to now. Pillar 
3 is basically a tax holiday for well to do employees who pay large personal income taxes and 
who can save for the future, thus they can use the tax credits. 
At this point, it is worth outlining the new pension system in more detail. As a starter, the 
normal retirement age was modified in 1996: for males, it was increased from 60 years to 61 in 
1997 and to 62 in 1999. For females, it was increased from 55 to 56 in 1997, 57 in 1999, 58 in 
2001, 59 in 2003, 60 in 2005, 61 in 2007 and 62 in 2009. To ease transition, however, even 
this protracted process was slowed down by elaborate transition rules. Even in 2006, every 
male above 60 and every female above 57 can retire with full benefit, if he or she has at least 38 
years of employment. The practical results are mixed (cf. Cseres Gergely, 2006): the average 
retirement ages were around the values mentioned above.  
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The parametric reform of the public pillar was quite cumbersome. In contrast to other 
similar reforms (e.g. in Poland, 1999), it has not introduced a simple formula for the entry 
pension, but maintained the nine brackets of progression and the four values of the accrual 
rates (3.3, 2, 1 and 1.5%) until 2013. True, by and large the progressivity has already been 
phased out by now (Table 6). The smooth reform had the advantage that it did not create gross 
injustices  between  close  cohorts  but  had  the  disadvantage  that  the  system  remained 
unintelligible to the participants and hid the emerging close relation between contributions 
and benefits.  
Table 6. 
 The elimination of progressivity for entry pensions, in percent 
Progression  1997  2002  2007 
100  57.3  78.9  89.8 
 90  13.8    5.6    4.0 
80    9.5    5.3    2.6 
70   6.5    4.5    1.1 
60   7.7     2.4    1.4 
50   3.4     1.6    0.3 
40   1.1    1.1    0.9 
30   0.4    1.2   
20   0.2      
Remark. The entry in the first column shows the marginal percent with which the 
individual’s  average  earning  in  his  highest  bracket  is  taken  into  account.  The 
entry in the second, third and fourth columns shows the percent of newly retired 
in the given category in year 1997, 2002 and 2007. 
Oral communication by Rudolf Borlói. 
 
To reduce earlier pension promises, the wage indexation of pensions was planned to be 
replaced by wage-price (i.e. Swiss) indexation from 2001, the greatest source of saving. From 
2013, the public entry pension will be a linear function of lifetime contributions but personal 
income tax should be paid after the pension benefit.  
All the workers except for the beginners were allowed to stay in the reformed monopillar 
system. But they were also allowed to enter the new, mixed system. Rather than paying the 
equivalent of 31%=8+23% of the gross wage into the monopillar public system, the members of 
the mixed system contribute 8% to their own, funded accounts and only the remaining 23% 
flow to the public pillar. (The employee's contribution is deducted from his gross wage, but the 
employer's contribution is added to it!) Starters had to enter the mixed system. The pension 
benefit in the mixed system will be the sum of 75% of the monopillar pension and the life  
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annuity coming from the capital accumulated on his own private pension account. Although it 
is not obvious, this Hungaricum hides a twist: those who already contributed to the public 
system before 1998, will lose 1/4 of those contributions! (This idea of self sacrifice is modelled 
in Simonovits (2003) and Smetters and Waliser (2004) but it is questionable if the participants 
were able to understand such a tricky choice.) 
Every member, who participated in the mixed system for at least 15 years, must choose one 
of four forms of life annuity at retirement, all indexed like the public pillar. The life annuity will 
be  unisex.  Other  participants  are  not  entitled  to  life  annuity,  rather  they  will  obtain  their 
private savings as lump sum payments. For those hypothetical fund members, whose private 
benefits would be greater than twice the lost component, i.e. 2/3 of the remaining P1 benefit, 
can withdraw the excess part. (Presumably, there will not be any person like this!) 
To make the transition apparently more attractive, private benefits were made inheritable 
in the following sense: if a member dies before retirement, his whole pension capital will be 
given to his pre assigned heir (not necessarily a relative). Other privileges were promised to the 
members:  (i)  if  somebody  becomes  disabled  before  retirement,  he  may  return  to  the 
monopillar public system without suffering any loss; (ii) if the pension investment will be so 
bad as to yield less than 3/4 of the corresponding 1/4 of the monopillar pension, then the 
government will top up his private benefit to 3/16=19% of the monopillar benefit, i.e. his mixed 
benefit will be 94% of the monopillar one. 
Who were the proponents and the opponents of such a pension reform in Hungary? It is 
not  easy  to  answer  this  question  (see  the  opposing  views  by  Holzmann,  Börsch Supan, 
Diamond and Valdés Prieto, 2001 in general). Being an opponent of the structural reform, I 
discern the following types among the proponents. Some supporters, including politicians were 
simply materially interested in the establishment of private pension funds. Others sincerely 
believed in the superiority of private funds over the pay as you go system (see the ten myths 
criticised by Orszag and Stiglitz (2001)). Individuals of a third type knew exactly the problems 
of such a transition but they were convinced that without obfuscating, the parametric reforms 
in the dominant public pillar could not be achieved. (Due to the much more serious problems–
the pension expenditure amounted to 17 rather than 10% of the GDP–, this last group was 
much larger in Poland than in Hungary.) Moreover, to obtain the much needed foreign loans, 
the Hungarian (and the Polish) government(s) needed the support of the World Bank (Müller, 
1999). 
I presume that the proponents of the reforms saw us, the opponents in a different light. 
According to them (i.e. Nelson, 2001, p. 248), some of the opponents of the privatisation might 
have  been  interested  in  maintaining  the  power  of  the  frozen  pension  bureaucracy.  Other 
opponents were simply considered as the mental prisoners of the collectivist past who did not 
want to trade in the last bastion of socialism for a new stronghold of capitalism.  
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3. THE WAY TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PENSION REFORM  
Before  turning  to  the  discussion  of  the  implementation  of  the  pension  reform,  we  should 
mention  that  since  1996  the  Hungarian  economy  started  to  develop  as  a  normal  market 
economy. Inflation went down to normal levels, GDP, consumption and wages started to grow. 
Since then real wages and pensions have increased rather fast, surpassing the 1989 base values 
by 13 and 2% by 2003 (Table 3) and after a temporary stagnation or slowdown in 2004, further 
increased in 2005 and 2006. At the same time, the registered employment rate has remained 
quite low, unable to approach the OECD levels. Even in 2003, the corresponding Hungarian 
and OECD employment rates were 73.7 vs. 76.5% for aged 25 54 and 28.9 vs. 40.2% for aged 
55 64 (European Commission, 2006, Table 3.2).   
In contrast to other reformer countries, the whole reform package was accepted at the same 
time, Summer 1997 in the Parliament and implemented in January 1, 1998. At that time the 
reform government had a 72% majority in the Parliament, therefore the passing of the law was 
almost automatic. 
There were some changes in the final law with respect to the original plan. We shall look at 
them one by one. (i) Originally, the share of the private contribution to the total was planned as 
1/2, then 1/3 and finally slightly above 1/4: 8 out 31%. Moreover, to reduce the transition costs 
(see below), for 1998 and 1999 the private contribution rate was set at 6 and 7%, respectively, 
and  was  going  to  reach  the  final  8%  only  in  2000. 
(ii) Originally, the law would have limited the age at 47 for the entrants to the mixed system 
(needed to obtain life annuity having at least 15 years of membership, until retirement at 62). 
But the participation in the mixed system was considered so advantageous that finally it was 
left open for everybody. (To prove the popularity of the mixed system, a leading politician 
boasted: four workers above 70 (seventy) joined the mixed system! Characteristically, she did 
not mention the extreme stupidity of such a decision!) (iii) Originally, different life annuities 
were considered for male and female members (like in Chile, see Cox Edwards, 2002) but this 
type of sex discrimination was eventually considered untenable and renounced. 
The mixed system was successfully promoted. The government did its best to convince the 
public that this combination is the best of all the possible worlds. There were a lot of ads 
promoting the mixed system and the newspapers gave detailed calculations whether a worker 
with a given profile should join the system or not, assuming that the rules had been fixed 
forever.  
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The new system was introduced in January 1, 1998 and the possibility to join it remained 
open until August 31, 1999. More than half of the workers voluntary joined it (much more than 
expected) and in conformity to the design, the younger a cohort was, the higher the ratio of 
joiners was (Table 7). (Remember that every joiner lost 1/4 of his pre reform contributions.) 
Table 7.  
Age and share of joiners in 1999 
Age group  Share in population %  Share of joiners % 
20 24  13.2  81.2 
25 29  13.1  83.8 
30 34  12.3  75.9 
35 39  12.1  60.0 
40 44  15.6  35.7 
45 49  14.9  15.1 
50 56  10.7    2.6 
 
The process of setting up the private pension funds was not that difficult. On the one hand, 
voluntary funds had been operating since 1993 and they could just open a mandatory branch. 
On the other hand, large financial insurance companies and banks formed their own pension 
funds, whose technical and financial possibilities were unlimited. 
The only problem with the transition was that in June 1998, a new government came to 
power, which opposed the pension reform. It was too late to reverse the reform but the new, 
"conservative" government made its best to discredit the reform.  
 
4. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS  
The earlier social insurance institutions (namely, the Hungarian Pension Fund) had no new 
tasks  with  the  reform.  Indeed,  the  individual  public  pension  accounts  have  not  yet  been 
introduced until now and the transfer of the private contributions to the chosen funds has been 
done directly by the employers, without central clearing. (To diminish operating costs, in the 
near  future  the  State  Tax  Authority  also  will  collect  the  private  pension  contributions  and 
distribute to assigned funds.) However, this transfer method has allowed the employers to 
influence  their  employees  in  their  choices  of  the  funds.  Anyway,  the  unhealthy  American 
practice of employers giving their own stocks to their employees has luckily been excluded.  
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In the description of the key institutions of the mixed system, we follow Augusztinovics et 
al. (2002), Impavido and Rocha (2006) and Iwasaki and Sato (2008). As mentioned above, 
mandatory pension funds of the mixed system grew out of the voluntary mutual pension funds, 
established since 1993. The final form was a compromise among pressure groups with different 
interests and the result is far from optimal. 
A mandatory private pension fund is a non profit organisation for collecting contributions 
from its members on individual accounts and investing these contributions. In a strange way, 
however,  these  funds  are  not  required  to  provide  life  annuities  for  their  members  after 
retirement.  Since  the  provision  of  indexed  unisex  life  annuities  by  private  funds  is  even 
theoretically unsolved (see Mitchell et al., 1999), it is an open issue who will provide these life 
annuities (see above). In my opinion the only solution is to centralise the pension capital at 
retirement  and  charge  a  central  institution  to  pay  life  annuities.  (Other  solutions  are 
mentioned in Impavido and Rocha (2006), relaxing indexation and neglecting the issue of 
unisex annuities.)  
Pension funds may be established by employers, chambers of commerce, trade unions and 
voluntary pension funds. The owners of a fund are its members, who exercise their rights 
through elected directors and supervisors. Since there are many members, this control is more 
formal than substantive. 
The fund is operated by appointed persons, under the control of a managing director, an 
auditor, an actuary, an investment manager, a legal officer and an internal auditor. The fund is 
required to operate "openly", publish a simplified version of its audited annual report. The 
fund can manage its assets by itself or external institutions. 
A public institution called State Financial Supervisory Authority, has been established, 
which supervises the functioning of the pension funds as well as the other parts of the financial 
sphere. Its president is chosen by the Parliament for six years. The private pension funds must 
submit quarterly and annual reports to the Authority.  
As a rule, about 4–5% of the member's contribution cover the fund's operational cost and 
another 1% goes into reserves.  The remaining 94–95% are invested in the member's personal 
account.  The  investments  are  regulated  carefully:  for  example,  a  fund  cannot  invest  a 
significant  part  of  its  assets  in  a  single  firm,  including  its  own.  Costs  of  investments  are 
deducted from the fund's gross returns. The funds must create various reserves. 
In theory, the competition among pension funds ensures that the operational costs are low. 
In reality, this is not the case (Impavido and Rocha, 2006). As in other countries with a similar 
system, in Hungary 80% of the members and the capital are concentrated in few, namely five 
big  funds.  In  oligopolistic  competition,  oligopoly  dominates  competition.  Therefore  the 
operational costs are high (5% of annual contributions plus 1 2% of the current assets per  
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year), the net returns are low. (For pessimistic and optimistic long run views, see Murthi et al. 
(2001) vs. James et al. (2001), respectively). 
Every  member  can  change  its  pension  fund  after  paying  only  a  modest  fee  and  the 
administrative burden of such a move is slight. Nevertheless, members do not change pension 
funds frequently. There is more than one reason for this lack of voting with feet. First, the 
funds' reports are often murky, thus it is not easy to see which pension fund is good and which 
is bad. (For example, the yields are given in gross rather than net form, in nominal rather than 
real terms.) Second, there may be a tacit collusion among the Big Five not to compete. Third, 
having  lived  for  fifty  years  in  socialism,  citizens  have  still  insufficient  financial  education, 
although serious problems exist in mature market economies as well. 
Having  discussed  the  development  of  the  private  pension  funds,  we  turn  now  to  the 
political risks and the problems with stable development of the implemented pension reform.  
Concerning the public pillar, public pensions increased spectacularly (by 55% between 1997 
and 2005 in real terms) and the pension contribution rates were drastically diminished: from 
31% (1998) to 26.5% (in 2003) and further reductions to 24.5 (2009) were planned (Table 8). 
The actual and promised reduction in the related health sector was even more spectacular and 
at the same time, more irresponsible. After the centre left coalition won the elections in April 
2006,  the  old new  government  admitted  these  grave  problems  and  suspended  further 
reductions and increased the employee's health contribution rate. 
Table 8.  
Pension contribution rates in Hungary: 1998−2007, % 
Years  Employer  Employee  Total 
1998  24  7  31 
1999  22  8  30 
2000  20  8  28 
2001  20  8  28 
2002  18  8  26 
2007  21     8.5    29.5 
2008  24     9.5    31.5 
Notes: 1. From 2006 to 2007, the employee's health contribution rate was increased by 3%, 
while the employer’s health contribution was reduced by 3%. In 2008, the employer's health 
contribution  rate  was  reduced  by  3%.,  while  the  corresponding  pension  contribution  was 
increased by 3%. At the same time, the financing of certain disability pensions was shifted 
from the Health Fund to the Pension Fund. 
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How have the two or three pillars functioned together? The twin problems of the partial 
privatisation  is  as  follows:  (i)  The  privatisation  required  so  much  attention  from  the 
government that it had no energy to make the dominant public pillar simpler, i.e. to introduce 
NDC like Poland or the German point system. (ii) Because of excessive operational costs, the 
average real yield of the private pension funds was zero between 1998 and 2005, although with 
significant variances (Matits, 2008). (In a strange way, most of the publications distort this 
fact  by  neglecting  the  losses  due  to  the  membership  fees,  a  'modest'  5%  of  the  annual 
contribution.) If these trends continue in the future, then a large part of the joiners will heavily 
lose with respect to those who stayed in the monopillar system (cf. Orbán and Palotai, 2005). 
Concerning  (ii),  a  hypothetical  calculation  will  be  helpful  (Table  9).  It  shows  the  expected 
relative  gains  and  losses  for  persons  joining  the  mixed  system,  compared  to  the  original 
benefits obtained in the monopillar system.  
Table 9.  
Relative gain/loss due to entering the mixed system  
  Years of service in the old system 
Relative interest 
rate 
0  10  20  30 
0  0  −6.3  −12.5*  −18.8 
2  12.8  4.0  −9.8*  −18.2 
4  34.4  10.1  −6.4  −17.5 
  Source: Simonovits (2003, Table A.1, p. 53). 
 
It is assumed that the individual will work 40 years, and we are changing the number of 
years in the monopillar system and the relative interest factor (roughly speaking, the difference 
between yield and wage growth rate). In order to underline the significance of government 
guaranty, we deliberately omit the −6% lower bound for persons serving at least 15 years in the 
mixed system but these cases are denoted by *. In the last column, there are no stars, however, 
because in these cases our individual will serve only 10=40−30 years in the mixed system, 
excluding  the  guaranty.  Was  this  the  reason  that  the  original  upper  bound  on  the  age  of 
entrance (47 years) was eliminated? Or had the socialist liberal government such a menacing 
forecast  on  the  benefits  in  the  unfunded  system  that  any  transition  was  considered  as 
advantageous? Anyway, sticking to the original laws, it can be seen that even after 20 years of 
past service, even in the case of the fabulous relative interest rate 4% (rather than the actual –
3%), the transition loss almost equals the guaranty. Since the actual yields have been lagging 
behind those appearing in the calculation, this actual loss of joiner is even larger.   
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What are the economic risk and the investment instruments of the pension funds? The 
Hungarian economy has been growing quite fast since the start of the pension reform (Table 2) 
until 2006 but the stock market behaved very wildly. Beginning our discussion with the start of 
the reform, from a relatively high level in 1998, the index of the Hungarian stock market was 
falling  for  years.  Since  2003,  it  has  not  only  regained  its  former  strength  but  has  been 
increasing spectacularly, though wildly fluctuating. (For comparison, the US stock prices have 
been  stagnating  since  2001!)  Due  to  the  overheating  of  the  economy,  the  consolidated 
government budget deficit is very high (6–8%), resulting in excessive interest rates. In such 
circumstances, the pension funds concentrated their assets in government bonds (Table 10), 
but because of the high operating costs, this has not assured positive real yields on average. But 
even if the pension funds had bought much more stocks, somebody would have to buy the 
government bonds, just to make up the revenues missing from the public pension system. 
Table 10.  
The structure of portfolio of pension funds, percentage  
(September 30, 2007) 
Type   Mandatory pension fund  Voluntary pension fund 
Cash and bank…    2.0    1.4 
Bonds   65.2  70.1 
Stocks         12.1   10.5 
Investment notes    17.8    12.3 
Other        3.0    5.6 
 
The  membership  fees  are  maximised  to  6  and  4.5  percents  since  2007  and  2008, 
respectively,  and  the  asset  proportional  cost  is  also  be  limited  to  0.9  and  0.8  percents, 
respectively. The minimal share of stock will be raised to 40 percent from 2009. 
Almost eleven years have elapsed since the reform started and only four years remain until 
the funds must start to pay life annuities. Nevertheless, the basic issue of indexed unisex life 
annuities is not solved.  
5. CHANGES SINCE THE REFORM 
The actual development of the mixed pension system was far from being as stable as it was 
planned in the pension law of 1997. As was already said, the conservative government of 1998–
2002  opposed  the  pension  privatisation  and  tried  to  make  it  less  attractive  by  all  means. 
Recapitulating our discussion: first of all, leaving aside the pension law of 1997, it did not 
increase the private contribution rate from 6 to 7 and 8% in 1999 and 2000, respectively and  
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did  not  compensate  the  joiners  with  appropriate  modifications  in  the  public  benefit  rules, 
either.  Furthermore,  the  conservative  government  did  not  close  the  gate  of  return  to  the 
monopillar system by 1999 but left it open until 2002. Then, just before losing the elections, it 
made the monopillar system the default option and the mixed system as the optional one even 
for  starters.  It  was  only  the  returning  reform  government,  which  raised  the  private 
contribution rate from 6 to 7 and 8% in 2003 and 2004, respectively and closed the door of 
return. This detour serves now as an excuse for the unanticipated weakness of the incentives to 
the proponents. 
There was a similar change in the guaranty. As mentioned before, according to the original 
law, the total benefit in the mixed system cannot be lower than 94% of the corresponding 
benefit in the monopillar system. But the conservative government eliminated this guaranty 
when  it  opened  the  return  way  to  the  monopillar  system.  And  the  returning  social liberal 
government has "forgotten" to reintroduce the guaranty when it reestablished the original, 
mandatory mixed system. A new twist arose when some members of the mixed system retired 
before contributing to the mixed system for the necessary minimal 15 years. These persons 
realised that they had made an error by joining the mixed system in 1998–1999, because they 
lost 1/4 of their pension rights accumulated until 1998 and they were unable to accumulate 
enough pension capital until retirement. In a strange way, the government gave in to the losers' 
demands and allowed them to return to the mixed system if their losses were larger than 6%. 
However, if persons had existed, who had lost less than 6%, they would not have got any 
compensation. (There are no such "lucky" persons yet!) This lack of monotonicity between loss 
and compensation shows the government's poor understanding of the principle of risk taking 
and compensation. 
The  fate  of  the  public  pillar  was  not  luckier,  either.  Despite  the  steady  growth  of  the 
economy, the conservative government delayed the proper indexation of pensions. In 1999, 
rather than raising the pensions by the growth rate of average net wage of the previous year  
(18%)  as  the  law  prescribed,  it  (re)introduced  the  theoretically  superior  forward looking 
indexation, and raised pensions only by 14%, incidentally coinciding with the actual rate of 
inflation. (To be fair, we should mention that such a trick was already used by the socialist–
liberal government in 1995/96, when – during accelerating inflation – it replaced the forward 
looking indexation by a backward looking indexation, to save 5% on the pension budget.) To 
minimise the fallout, the conservatives returned to the communist past and raised the benefits 
by the maximum of a modest lump sum and 11%. The parametric change punished 84% of the 
pensioners. Only just before the elections in 2002, did the conservative government try to 
make up the deficits and raised benefits faster than the indexation rule dictated.   
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The socialist–liberal opposition, however, skilfully exposed that government's trick and by 
whatever reason, won the election. Returning to power, the coalition paid a compensation for 
the loss suffered in 1999 to every pensioner (also illogically a lump sum and even to those few 
pensioners who gained in 1999 or those who were net yet pensioners in 1999). Furthermore, 
the new socialist liberal government of 2002 introduced a 13th month pension, weakening its 
own saving plan as of 1997. (Since this extra pension was introduced as a one week additional 
pension every year, this measure raised the benefits about 2% per year, about the difference 
between the old and the new indexation in a normal real wage growth. It is another question 
that  the  real  wages  also  grew  without  restraint,  by  30%  during  the  four  year.  Thus  the 
introduction of the 13th pension and the Swiss indexation saved the difference between the 
actual and the normal annual wage increase (7 vs. 4 percent) for the government's pension 
budget.) 
In  order  to  solve  a  pressing  social  issue,  the  same  government  increased  the  widow's 
pensions by 50%, from 20 to 30% of the deceased spouse's benefit. Returning to the unwanted 
sensitivity  of  the  benefits  on  the  year  of  retirement  displayed  in  Table  4,  the  government 
elaborated a law of correction in 2005, which will eliminate the most unjust features of the past 
pension policy between 2006 and 2010.  
At the end of this section, we should also make some remarks on the voluntary pension 
pillar, numbered as 3 or even 4 (for more details, see Simonovits, 2009).  As was already 
mentioned, voluntary pension funds appeared in Hungary at the end of 1993, providing huge 
tax relief for the employer's and the employee's contributions. About a third of the employees 
are members of a voluntary fund and on average, they contribute 3.6% of the average gross 
wage to their funds (1.2% by themselves, 2.4% by their employers). 
In a country, where there were no private pension funds until 1993, where the financial 
sector was very underdeveloped and the public pension system was very redistributive, such a 
reform can be defended. It is another question whether the tax credit (the rate as well as the 
size) was not excessive. (I think both were excessive, especially at the start, authorising a well 
to do member to put almost one year average net wage into his account and receiving half of it 
back  immediately.)  Later  reforms  only  changed  the  form  but  not  the  size  of  this  perverse 
redistribution, by opening up tax exemptions for employer's contributions. Since 2000, the 
rate of tax exemption on employee's contribution was diminished but it is still significant. 
(Rather than authorising the direct withdrawal of 30% of the annual saving as before, the 
government  adds  the  same  amount  to  these  accounts  and  they  can  only  be  used  after 
retirement.) Note also that a second (!) Pillar 3, called Pillar 4 was introduced in 2006. The 
reason for introducing the new pillar was correct: here the annual fee cannot be higher than 1% 
of the assets, but at least 70% of the contributions should be invested into stocks. Meanwhile, 
mandatory  pension  funds  are  part  of  the  system  and  the  public  pillar  ceased  to  be  
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redistributive.  Taking  into  account  these  changes,  in  my  opinion,  nothing  justifies  the 
preservation  of  so  large  tax  credits.  But  only  a  dramatic  deterioration  of  public  finances 
compelled the government to diminish the maximum of the employer's contribution from the 
minimum wage to its half from 2007. 
6. EFFECTS OF THE REFORM 
The original idea of the Hungarian pension reform can be summarised as follows: introducing 
a mandatory private pillar will provide such a good private pension for the joiners that the 
burden of the public system will significantly be diminished. The public pillar – with all its 
alleged pitfalls (defined benefit, lack of funding, etc.) – is only needed as a safety net. Different 
semiofficial projects outlined different scenarios but even the most cautious projections (e.g. 
Palacios and Rocha, 1998) forecast the creation of a long run equilibrium.  (If somebody wants 
to see the "flexibility" of such reform plans, it is sufficient to compare the "development" of 
Martin Feldstein's reform ideas from full privatisation to partial privatization, etc. in the US.) 
The issue of transaction costs was somewhat neglected during the Hungarian reform. It is 
well known from the theoretical as well as the practical literature that during any transition 
from a fully unfunded system to a (partly or fully) funded system, the contributions to the 
private  funds  will  be  missing  from  the  public  revenues.  Either  the  government  puts  the 
"double" burden on the shoulders of the workers of transition, or finances the whole transition 
from  debt  or  reduces  the  benefits  drastically,  or  combining  these  paths.  "There  is  no  free 
lunch!"  
The Hungarian governments planned a combined strategy of debt financing and relative 
benefit  reduction  (both  for  the  joiners  and  the  pensioners).  Nevertheless,  the  political 
competition prevented the political leadership from following this strategy in a consistent way: 
various governments increased the benefits and reduced contribution rates much more than 
was originally planned. As an afterthought, in 2004, six years after the reform started, the 
socialist liberal government tried to change the budgetary rules and reduce the official budged 
deficit with the contributions flowing to the private pillar (cc. 1.4% of the GDP in 2004). The 
EU  was  not  pleased  with  this  procedure  and  only  authorised  the  Hungarian  and  other 
governments to do this trick until 2009 and in a linearly decreasing measure.  
As if everything were all right, at the end of 2005 the socialist liberal government made 
into law a significant (5% points) reduction in the total health and pension contribution rate 
between 2007–2009, and the unified deficit of the health and pension fund already reached 
4% of the GDP, without having an offsetting budget surplus in other sectors. The dominant 
conservative party in opposition, just before elections to be held in April 2006, announced an 
utterly  irresponsible  plan:  if  it  wins,  it  will  reduce  the  employer's  (health  and  pension)  
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contribution rates from 29 to 19% from July 2006, and introduce a 14th month pension later 
on. The alleged source of this operation is the expected jump in employment and whitening of 
the  economy:  simple  nonsense.  After  the  electoral  victory,  the  old new  government 
immediately withdrew its promises concerning reduction. It admitted that without imposing 
austerity measures, the budget deficit with pension corrections would reach 11% of the GDP 
this year, and to "impress" the public, renounced pension corrections, reducing the budget 
deficit to 9.2% in 2006. As part of the restrictions, the employer's pension contribution rate 
was  immediately  raised  from  18  to  21%  (Table  8).  Concerning  health  contributions,  the 
government  increased  the  employee's  health  contribution  rate  from  4  to  6  and  7%  from 
September 2006 and January 2007, respectively, reducing the net wages. It also preserved the 
much reduced lump sum health contribution, about 1% of the average wage. For the newly 
retired,  the  employee's  pension  contribution  was  excluded  from  the  assessed  wage  in  the 
pension formula, reducing new pension with respect to the previous rule about 8 percent since 
January 2008. (The reduction would be greater if the insufficient valorisation had not been 
also eliminated.) These and other related measures improved the budget by about 2% of the 
GDP.  Since  2008,  a  new  set  of  contribution  rates  was  introduced,  shifting  part  of  the 
disability contribution from the health care budget into the pension budget. The government 
presumably hoped that having succeeded with the austerity measures, growth will return and 
solve  the  problems  of  the  pension  system  as  well.  The  loss  of  the  minor  coalition  partner 
transformed the Socialist government into a minority one. 
The arrival of the world economic crisis has buried these hopes. The growth forecast for 
2009  dropped  from  3%  to  –3%  from  September  to  next  January.  The  government  has 
presented several plans to make ends meet. To start with, it limited the 13th month benefit at 
the  average  monthly  benefit  and  withdrew  it  from  early  retiree,  saving  about  1/3  of  the 
monthly benefit. It also limited the annual earning of early retirees at the annual minimum 
wage. 
The latest reform package would eliminate the 13th month pension benefit for those retiring 
after June 30, 2009, while preserving it for those already retired. To alleviate future tensions, 
the government will pass a law, raising the normal retirement age from 62 to 65, four month a 
year from 2016. By rearranging the tax and contribution system, the contribution rate would 
be reduced by 5 percent points within two years, possibly helping employment.  
At the same time, a non partisan Reform Alliance called for much deeper reforms. Within 
the radical transformation of the tax and transfer system, it would eliminate the 13th benefit 
immediately;  raise  the  normal  retirement  age  from 62  to  65  between  2010  and  2012,  and 
replacing Swiss indexation by pure price indexation. At the same time, the plan would reduce 
the contribution rate by 10 percent points in three years, while raising the fixed health care 
contribution.  
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It is possible that the government’s measures are still to shy; but I think that the Reform 
Alliance’s plans are too brave. The elimination of the 13t benefit would reduce the pension 
expenditure  by  8%,  but  it  would  put  a  too  heavy  burden  to  the  poorest  pensioners.  The 
immediate  raise  in  the  retirement  age  would  mostly  increase  the  number  of  unemployed, 
which is already on the rise.  
As a compromise, perhaps the 13th benefits should be phased out the same way as it was 
phase in, i.e. during four years. The raise in the normal retirement age can be started in 2011 
rather than 2016 and it can be 6 month in every year. But the incentives for late retirement and 
fines for earlier retirements should be planned much more carefully than now: they should be 
string enough to have any effect but they should be fair enough to be accepted by the society. 
At  this  point  it  is  worth  mentioning  the  worldwide  collapse  of  stock  prices  and  the 
temporary (?) loss of 20% of the pension funds’ stocks. Hungary was among the maximal 
losers, along with Ireland and the US. Small wonder that the proponents of privatization now 
consider  the  eventual  government  bail  out  of  the  losers,  who  joined  the  mixed  system 
voluntary. 
7. GENERAL (PRELIMINARY) ASSESSMENT 
Has the reform been a success? If one counts the share of participants in the mixed system, 
then  the  reform  was  a  success:  50%  of  workers  joined  voluntary  and  another  20%  of  the 
working force were born into it. If one calculates the capital accumulated in private pension 
funds, then he can boast that during eleven years such a monumental sum was accumulated 
(cc. 7% of the GDP). However, if one asks whether the pension system is functioning better 
now than before the reform, then he might have serious doubts. Gál et al. (2001) and Gál and 
Tarcali (2003) provide detailed studies of the partial impacts of the various reform measures, 
using the methodology of Generational Accounts developed by Auerbach et al. (1994). Their 
punch line  is  as  follows:  it  is  the  introduction  of  Swiss  indexation  rather  than  partial 
privatizasion that improves the balance in the planned reform. 
It is noteworthy that more recent evaluations of the reform by World Bank experts, Rocha 
and Vittas (2002) and Impavido and Rocha (2006) admitted that the Hungarian reform has 
not been as successful as they hoped for. Agreeing with a very thorough analysis of Orbán and 
Palotai  (2005),  I  think  that  the  pension  reform  was  not  really  successful.  Concerning  the 
design  of  public  pillar,  the  macrodeficits  are  much  bigger  now  than  they  were  before  the 
reform. And only a part of the budgetary problems is connected to the inevitable transition cost 
(the contributions flowing to the private funds are missing from public revenue). A really good 
pension system should attract workers to contribute fully and delay retirement. (For example,  
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the covered wage output ratio dropped from 40 to 34% between 1992 and 2000.) The solution 
of this task remains for the future.  
Since  the  mandatory  private  (second)  pillar  was  already  introduced  in  Hungary  eleven 
years ago, there is no point to discuss its alternative. Now every expert must try to make its 
functioning as good as possible. The key issue is to minimise its operational costs. Following 
the Swedish example, a clearing house should be set up, in order to increase the real yields. But 
the mandatory public (first) pillar should not be neglected, either. Individual accounts should 
be introduced as soon as possible. The awkward pension formula should be replaced by a 
simpler  one.  The  long run  harmony  between  contributions,  taxes  and  benefits  should  be 
achieved.  
The detailed plans to be followed are simply missing. For example, it is very difficult to 
conceive how the members of the mixed system will react to the new situation when they 
experience that the fellow workers remaining in the monopillar system obtain much better 
pensions than those "who chose freedom". Until the first members of the mixed system will 
receive benefits in 2013, these issues should be solved. 
What can be expected for the average income and the income distribution in old age in the 
future, for example, if the new scheme is maturing, and because of economic and demographic 
changes? Some experts (e.g. Augusztinovics and Köllő, 2008) paint a very dark picture, fearing 
of a huge mass of new pensioners having no pension rights. As a way out, she suggests an 
introduction of a significant basic pension for every pensioner, a hidden return to the already 
fading progressive public pensions. Others, including the present author, are more optimistic, 
furthermore, we are afraid of a further change in the relation of Pillars 1 and 2 can undermine 
the  credibility  of  the  whole  system  (Simonovits,  2008b).  A  third  group  of  experts,  (EU 
Commission  Report,  2006)  is  also  very  sceptical  about  the  long term  solvency  of  the 
Hungarian pension system, claiming that by 2050, the public pension expenditures will rise to 
17.1% of the GDP from 10.4% in 2004. Of course, these projections are not forecasts, they 
simply serve to warn the government on the dangers ahead in 2004.  
The structural reforms have created mixed systems, first in Hungary, then in Poland and 
other  ex socialist  countries.  Only  Slovenia  and  the  Czech Republic have  been  resisting  the 
temptation to partially privatise and prefund their pension systems. It is interesting to note 
that these two countries are the most developed in the area and they followed special routes in 
the other fields of privatisation as well. (For international comparisons of the pension reforms 
among the developed transition countries, see Fultz, ed. (2002) and Schmähl and Horstmann, 
eds.  (2002).)  It  will  take  much  more  time  to  arrive  to  reliable  judgement  on  the  pension 
reforms in Hungary and its neighbours. What is already clear, however, is that the introduction 
of a mixed system may create more problems than it solves.  
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APPENDIX: CONTRIBUTION RATES 
In this Appendix we discuss several issues of contribution rates. In contrast to the tradition of 
some  market  economies  (Germany  and  the  US),  in  the  Hungarian  and  other  ex socialist 
countries the employee's contribution rate was and is much lower than the employer's. This 
practice artificially reduces the gross wage and inflates the total contribution rate with respect 
to indices of countries with balanced employee and employer's contributions. Indeed, if the 
Hungarian government had repartitioned the contribution rates as 8+23=15.5+15.5% in 1998, 
then  –  fixing  the  net  earnings  and  the  total  wage  cost  –  the  gross  wage  would  have  also 
increased by 15.5–8=7.5% to 107.5, and on this new base, a contribution rate 14.4+14.4=28.8% 
would  have  delivered  the  same  results.  Making  a  similar  operation  on  the  health  care 
contribution rates 4+11=15%=7.5+7.5, the gross wage could have been farther increased to 111, 
making room for the reduction of the pension contribution rates to 14+14=28% and the health 
care contribution rates 6.8+6.8=13.6%. Summing up, such an operation would have reduced 
the total contribution rate from 46% to 41.4%. Moreover, it would have made a larger part of 
the social security contributions visible to the workers: 21 rather than 12% of the gross wage. 
A second issue is a lump sum health contribution that every employer had to pay after 
every employee since 1996. This sum was especially high during the conservative government, 
reaching 9% of the minimal wage and 3.7% of the average gross wage in 2002. As already 
mentioned, a modest amount of a little above 1% of the average gross wage will be retained 
rather than abolished at the end of 2006. 
A  third  issue  is  the  interaction  between  personal  income  tax  and  social  security 
contributions. In Hungary the base of social security contributions is the same as that of the 
personal income tax, namely the gross wage. Therefore – fixing the two genuine economic 
categories, the net wage and the total labour costs – any rise in the personal income tax rate 
increases the gross wage and a fortiori the volume of social security contributions. And the 
effective personal income tax rate significantly increased between 1998 and 2002 and similarly 
diminished between 2002 and 2006. These complications should be considered at evaluating 
Table 8. For example, in 2007, just the nominal net wages diminished by 3% to make room to 
the increase in the employee's health contribution.  
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